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ON DIFFERENCE-SPLITTING AND THE EQUAL WEIGHT
VIEW
Abstract. Dawid, DeGroot and Mortera showed, a quarter century ago, that
any agent who regards a fellow agent as a peer{in particular, defers to the fellow
agent's prior credences in the same way that she defers to her own{and updates
by split-the-dierence is prone (on pain of triviality) to diachronic incoherence.
On the other hand one may show that there are special scenarios in which
Bayesian updating approximates dierence splitting, so it remains an important
question whether it remains a viable (approximate) response to \generic" peer
update. We critique arguments by two teams of philosophers (Fitelson & Jehle
and Nissan-Rozen & Spectre) against this updating scheme, then suggest an
alternative \Equal Weight" response to cases of peer disagreement.
1. On an old triviality result for split-the-difference
According to the so-called Equal Weight View, \When you count an advisor as
an epistemic peer, you should give her conclusions the same weight as your own"
(Elga 2007). Some philosophers have taken \splitting the dierence" (i.e., adop-
tion of the arithmetic mean) between competing peer credences to be constitutive
of the Equal Weight View. Kelly (2010), e.g., writes:
...if the agnostic gives credence .5 to the proposition that God
exists while the atheist gives credence .1 to the same propo-
sition, the import of The Equal Weight View is clear: upon
learning of the other's opinion, each should give credence .3
to the proposition that God exists.
The popularity of Equal Weight dierence splitting persists, despite the fact that
it was shown, a quarter century ago in Dawid, DeGroot and Mortera (1995), to
entail probabilistic incoherence. Indeed, it has been disputed that this coher-
ence result applies at all to the situation that interests us, namely that of two
peers having identical evidence but dierent priors. Bradley (2018), for example,
rehearses a version of the result, but goes on to write:
...this study leaves open the question of whether linear averag-
ing is the appropriate response to situations in which you nd
yourself in disagreement with peers who hold the same infor-
mation as you and are as good at judging its signicance. In
the philosophical literature, the view that one should respond
to such disagreements by taking an equal-weighted average of
your opinions has been hotly debated. But nothing presented
here militates either for or against this view.
1
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In this section, we make the case that considerations very much along the lines
of Dawid et. al. (1995) do \militate" (decisively) against split-the-dierence in
cases where two peers1 hold the same information but do not have almost surely
identical prior credences. We begin by supposing that i and j are agents and P is
a proposition-valued random variable, so that i's initial credence x in P and j's
initial credence y in P are also random variables. We take P 's distribution to be
supported on propositions P0 for which i and j are peers.
Because P is a random variable, there is some ambiguity concerning \credence in
P" we need to address. Suppose that a card, c, is drawn from a standard deck
and P is either Card c is a face card or Card c is an Ace (with equal probabilities).
In this case, P is in fact Card c is an Ace, but i doesn't know this. In such a case
there are two readings of \i's credence in P". On the rst reading, it refers to
i's credence in Card c is an Ace, namely 1
13
. On the second reading it refers to
i's credence in the proposition either P is \Card c is a face card" and Card c is
a face card or P is \Card c is an Ace" and Card c is an Ace, namely 2
13
. We'll
write Cri(P ) when we intend the rst reading and Cri(T (P )) when we intend the
second. (It may help to think of T (P ) as \P is true", read de dicto.) Notice that
Cri(P ) = x regardless of whether i knows the value of P , whereas it will typically
be the case that Cri(T (P )) = x only after i learns P or at least Cri(P ).
When we say that i is \diachronically coherent almost surely" or \Reection2
obeying almost surely", we mean that if i's credence in P0 is x0 then
Ey(u(x; y)jP = P0) = x0;
where u(x; y) denotes the posterior credence in P adopted by i upon learning the
values of P , x and y. (Or in T (P ) upon learning just x and y.) In particular, for
almost every x0 in the essential range of x one has
Ey(u(x; y)jx = x0) = x0:
That is, if she were to learn her own initial credence x = x0 (without learning P )
then she would both come to have credence x0 in T (P ) and expected posterior
(posterior to learning y, that is) credence x0 in T (P ).
1Splitting the dierence with a non-peer can, by contrast, be coherent; if my credence in P
is one-half and I believe that your credence in whichever of P , :P is true is 1 with probability
:75 and zero with probability .25 then I surely don't consider you a peer (it seems that I think
you are more sensitive to which of P , :P is true, yet wildly overcondent), but should intend
to split the dierence with you when you tell me your credence.
2\Reection" was coined by van Fraassen (1984). Roughly, an agent satises it when her
current credence in a proposition P is equal to the expectation of her credence in P at a future
time t, where t is typically an almost-surely future, possibly random time satisfying certain
technical criteria (a so-called \stopping time"{see Schervish et. al. 2004). In the current
application t is the time immediately after j's credence in P is revealed.
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Here is a natural necessary condition on peerhood.
PN: If i is diachronically coherent almost surely and regards
j as a peer then for almost every y0 in the essential range of
y one has Ex(u(x; y)jy = y0) = y0.
PN cashes out the intuition that if i regards j as a peer then she has the same
condence in j's initial credences that she has in her own. As observed above, if i
were to learn that, and only that, x = x0, then she would come to have credence
x0 in T (P ). So if she regards j as a peer and were to learn that, and only that,
y = y0, then she ought, similarly, to come to have credence y0 in T (P ). But if
she learns the value of x, say x = x0, after learning that y = y0, her posterior
credence in T (P ) will be u(x0; y0). By Reection, then, her current (i.e. after
learning y = y0 but before learning x = x0) credence, namely y0, should be the
expectation of this posterior, that is Ex(u(x; y)jy = y0).
We can now establish incoherence (on pain of triviality) of split-the-dierence
(and more \general linear pooling") for Equal Weighters.
Theorem 1. If i is diachronically coherent almost surely, regards j as a peer and
updates by linear pooling (i.e. u(x; y) = wx + (1   w)y, where 0 < w < 1) then
Prob(x 6= y) = 0.
Proof. For reductio, assume that Prob(x 6= y) > 0. The following is routine:
Lemma 1. If X is a random variable and E(X) = k then
E(X   kjX > k)Prob(X > k) = E(k  XjX < k)Prob(X < k):
Since j is diachronically coherent almost surely, for almost every x0 in the essential
range of x one has
Ey((u(x; y)jx = x0) = Ey(wx+ (1  w)yjx = x0) = x0:
But obviously Ey(xjx = x0) = x0, so in fact Ey(yjx = x0) = x0. By Lemma 1,
Ey(y   xjx = x0 ^ y > x)Prob(y > xjx = x0)
=Ey(x  yjx = x0 ^ y < x)Prob(y < xjx = x0):
Multiplying both sides of this equation by x0, we can move occurrences of x0
inside the expectations (since these are integrals in the variable y). So for a.e. x0,
Ey(x(y   x)jx = x0 ^ y > x)Prob(y > xjx = x0)
=Ey(x(x  y)jx = x0 ^ y < x)Prob(y < xjx = x0):
ON DIFFERENCE-SPLITTING AND THE EQUAL WEIGHT VIEW 4
Integrating over x0, we get
E(x(y   x)jy > x)Prob(y > x) = E(x(x  y)jy < x)Prob(y < x): (1)
Since i regards j as a peer, for almost every y0 in the essential range of y one has
Ex(wx+ (1  w)yjy = y0) = y0 (by PN). But obviously Ex(yjy = y0) = y0, so in
fact Ex(xjy = y0) = y0. By Lemma 1, it follows that
Ex(x  yjy = y0 ^ x > y)Prob(x > yjy = y0)
=Ex(y   xjy = y0 ^ x < y)Prob(x < yjy = y0):
Multiplying by y0 and employing x > y or y > x where applicable,
Ex(x(x  y)jy = y0 ^ x > y)Prob(x > yjy = y0)
Ex(y(x  y)jy = y0 ^ x > y)Prob(x > yjy = y0)
=Ex(y(y   x)jy = y0 ^ x < y)Prob(x < yjy = y0)
Ex(x(y   x)jy = y0 ^ x < y)Prob(x < yjy = y0);
for a.e. y0, with strict inequality wherever Prob(x > yjy = y0) is positive. Inte-
grating over y0, we therefore get
E(x(y   x)jx > y)Prob(x > y) > E(x(x  y)jx < y)Prob(x < y):
Multiplying both sides by -1, swapping sides and rearranging some comparisons,
we get
E(x(y   x)jy > x)Prob(y > x) > E(x(x  y)jy < x)Prob(y < x);
contradicting (1). qed
These considerations look to kill the dierence splitting implementation of the
Equal Weight View. On the other hand, coherent peer update schemes may
approximate dierence splitting. There is, moreover, a simple way of constructing
such schemes. Namely, by considering the parallel case in which the agents had the
same original priors, but have since acquired dierent evidence. Though this isn't
the case we are interested in, the existence of these scenarios limits the methods
by which one can argue. In particular, the existence of dierent-evidence scenarios
in which approximate dierence splitting is mandated prevents one from arguing
against dierence splitting in the same evidence case on incoherence grounds;
for some joint distributions of the agents' priors (those arising in the dierent
evidence case), it is coherent.
We sketch such a scenario. Suppose a point x is chosen uniformly at random on
the unit interval. A standard Brownian motion Z is initiated at x and evolves
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until it exits the interval. P is the event that it exits to the right, i.e. at 1. Neither
i nor j know the value x. Suppose next that two independent standard Brownian
motions, Zi and Zj, are initiated at x and stopped at time t = 10
 24. i is told the
value xi = Zi(t) and j is told the value xj = Zj(t). Since the standard deviation,
10 12, of xi is so small, and since the expectation of xi is x, the expectation x
0
i
of x conditional on xi (= i's probability for P conditional on xi) will, with high
probability, be extremely close to (distance much less than 10 12) xi. Similarly,
j's credence in P will be, with high probability, extremely close to xj.
On the other hand, the expected value x0 of x conditional on xi and xj will with
high probability be extremely close to (distance much less than jxi   xjj) the
midpoint of xi and xj; so when i and j share their credences, they will, with
high probability, adopt posterior credence x0 = u(x0i; x
0
j) in P extremely close to
(relative to jx0i   x
0
jj) the midpoint of their shared credences x
0
i and x
0
j.
To reiterate, though this is not a same evidence scenario, the update rule u(; )
that falls out of it will be coherent in any same-evidence scenario in which the
joint distribution of the peers agents' priors x0i and x
0
j is the same. So to argue
against peer update schemes that approximate dierence splitting, one would have
either to propose norms directly constraining such joint distributions, or propose
indirect constraints. We examine two approaches of the latter sort presently.
2. On an overrestrictive peerhood constraint of Nissan-Rozen
and Spectre
Ittay Nissan-Rozen and Levi Spectre (2017) present an original argument against
dierence splitting as an implementation of the Equal Weight View. It fails, as
we shall demonstrate. It begins with a novel proposed constraint on peerhood:
Our main contribution takes the form of a pragmatic con-
straint on the notion of peerhood: if an agent, j, is your peer,
then assuming that j is sympathetic{she wants you to gain
as much as possible{you should be willing{in exchange for a
certain payo{to let her decide for you whether to accept a
bet with positive expected utility. If you are not willing to ac-
cept this exchange even for a sure payo, you do not seriously
regard j as your peer.
Nissan-Rozen and Spectre now prove the following theorem, in which P is a
proposition for which i has an initial credence, and i is committed to updating
via linear pooling (with weight w) upon learning j's initial credence.
Theorem 2. (Nissan-Rozen and Spectre 2017) Let i be an agent for whom j is
a fully rational and sympathetic peer. For any credence function of i that assigns
a non-trivial probability value to the possibility that j's degree of belief in P is
dierent from i's degree of belief in P , and for any 0 < w < 1, there always exists
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a bet with positive expected utility such that i (if she updates by linear pooling
with weights w, 1 w) will be willing to pay a positive amount of utility in order
to avoid passing the choice of whether to accept the bet (on i's behalf) to j.
The bet guaranteed by Theorem 2 violates Nissan-Rozen and Spectre's pragmatic
constraint. If the constraint is viable, then, linear pooling Equal Weighters do
not regard their fellow agents as peers, which implies in particular that dierence
splitting cannot be a viable implementation of the Equal Weight View.3
Nissan-Rozen and Spectre claim that their constraint (in conjunction with The-
orem 2) \makes room for the development of a new Conciliatory view that calls
for varying weights" (Nissan-Rozen and Spectre 2017). We interpret \variable
weight" to imply an update rule for which u(x; y) lies strictly between x and y,
if x 6= y, and u(x; x) = x.4 But on this understanding, Theorem 2 doesn't, in
fact, make room for such views; to what extent the argument attaches a decient
notion of peerhood to split-the-dierence, plausible variable weight Conciliatory
views are collateral damage.
To see why, let u(y) be i's posterior credence under such a scheme when i learns
y = Crj(P ). Since we are assuming a \variable weight" rule the function u(y)
satises u(y) = x for x = y, with u(y) strictly between x and y otherwise. Since
i regards j as a peer, meanwhile, we can assume that u(y) is strictly increasing.
Finally, since i is coherent, she should obey Reection; in particular her initial
credence x = Cri(P ) is the expectation of her posterior, i.e. x = Ey(u(y)).
Under these assumptions, one can always nd a bet that i will pay a positive
amount to avoid passing to j whenever y isn't, by i's lights, equal to x almost
3Nissan-Rozen and Spectre also prove that there will be a bet with positive expected utility
such that a dierence splitting i will be inclined to pay a positive amount of utility in order
to pass the bet to j. This violates an apparently endorsed (if only implicitly) variant of their
constraint whereby you should be willing{in exchange for a certain payo{to decide for yourself
whether to accept a bet with positive expected utility in a case where you are otherwise obliged
to pass it to j. The details aren't precisely the same, but this variant overgeneralizes as well,
and so cannot be used to resuscitate the Nissan-Rozen/Spectre argument. In any event we set
this aside, as they don't formally invoke (or even formulate) the variant in question.
4Some authors (e.g. Easwaran et. al. 2016) advocate for synergy, which implies that in case
y = x 6= 1
2
, i's posterior distribution should be more extreme than the common initial credence.
Synergy is appropriate to the more common case where disagreeing peers have dierent evidence
and the same priors. Suppose for example that i and j have common prior distribution that is
uniform on [0; 1] for the bias of a coin and are each allowed to toss the coin once, privately. If
they reconvene and simultaneously announce credence of 1
3
in the next toss of the coin landing
heads, they will update not to 1
3
but to 1
4
(Laplace rule of succession). That is because their
disclosures eectively allow for a pooling of evidence. Something like this is going on, for
example, when so-called meta-analyses obtain \statistically signicant" results (i.e. suciently
extreme p values) by pooling studies that individually were unable to derive such results. In
the same-evidence case we are interested in, however, the practice is plainly unjustied, indeed
a bit like concluding that, because a certain balloon looks orange to everyone in the room, it
must therefore be red.
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surely. For in such a case i must, by non-triviality and Reection, assign positive
probability to the event y < u(y) < x. Let y0 be the essential inmum of y.
5
Choose k with y0 < k < u(y0) < x. Bet 1 pays 1 if P is true and pays 0 if P
is false, if accepted; one receives a sure k if Bet 1 is rejected. Since i's posterior
(after learning y, that is) credence in P is almost surely greater than k, acceptance
of Bet 1 has positive expected utility for i. She will be willing, moreover, to pay
any amount less than (u(y0)  k)Prob(y < k) > 0 to avoid having this bet passed
to j, since j would reject it whenever y < k.
We think what Nissan-Rozen and Spectre had in mind was that one should deem
a peer as being no worse (in expectation) than oneself when it comes to accepting
or rejecting a bet of the form given (1 if the proposition is true and 0 if it is false,
if accepted; a certain amount c if rejected), prior to learning one's own initial
credence x in the proposition in question. Once one learns the value of x, that
might change. If x is very close to c, the agent will recognize that the expected
relative utility of her choice is small (non-existent, when x = c), and she may
want to pass the bet to j. In at least some other cases (cases in which x and c
are not close, typically), she will be inclined to want to eld the bet herself.
The proposed constraint is therefore implausible{it would, if valid, rule out too
much. That is to say, it can't be a requirement of peerhood that for every such
oer one should think that one's peer has expected return not less than one's
own. We conclude that Nissan-Rozen and Spectre's argument fails.
3. On a would-be desideratum of Fitelson and Jehle
Fitelson and Jehle (2009) attempt to discredit dierence splitting simpliciter (i.e.
their argument does not invoke peerhood) on the grounds that it fails to com-
mute with conditionalization. Such an argument, it's probably worth mentioning,
cannot counsel against dierence splitting for two cell partitions, for the simple
reason that if one conditionalizes on a non-trivial event from a two cell partition,
the resulting space is trivial and there is only one candidate credence function over
it. So Theorem 1 is more general, even if this alternative argument has merit.
The argument in its current form has serious problems, however, owing to the
fact that Fitelson and Jehle believed the matter to be much simpler than it is.
Indeed, they regarded it as transparent enough to relegate to a footnote:
5That is, Prob(y < y0) = 0, but Prob(y > y0 + ) > 0 for every  > 0.
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Some Bayesian defenders of EWV require that (ideally) the
result of an EWV update should be equivalent to a (classi-
cal) conditionalization, which conditionalizes \on whatever y-
ou...have learned about the circumstances of the disagreemen-
t" (Elga 2007, 490). If that's right, then [commutativity] will
follow from the denition of (classical) Bayesian condition-
alization, since pairs of (classical) conditionalizations must
commute. (Fitelson and Jehle 2009, footnote 12.)
That unfortunately isn't right. What's true is that if i conditions on A and then
conditions on B, she should arrive at the same posterior as if she were to have
rst conditioned on B and then on A. But that's not what's going on here.
Suppose for example that i's original prior on (A;B;C) is (1
2
; 1
4
; 1
4
) and j's is
(1
4
; 1
2
; 1
4
). It is certainly true that i should arrive at the same posterior if she rst
learned j's credence function then learned :C as she should if she rst learned
:C and then learned j's original prior. And these are just the propositions i will
learn in a case where the agents rst perform a peer update and then condition on
:C. It is not, however, what i will learn if the agents rst condition on :C and
then perform a peer update. In the latter case, i will learn only that j's original
prior was of the form (x; 2x; 1   3x) for some 0 < x  1
3
. There is no reason to
think, then, that her posterior here must be the same.
In fact, one can easily construct coherent peer update rules that fail to commute
with conditionalization: rules that approximate split-the-dierence, for example,
will violate this commutativity. The two-cell scheme presented at the end of
Section 1 can be adapted to three cells to this end, as we now show.
Consider an equilateral triangle and a point generated uniformly at random in its
interior, having barycentric coordinates (x; y; z) (x, y and z denote the distances
from the point to the sides of the triangle; we assume x + y + z = 1). A two
dimensional Brownian motion will be initiated at this point. When it hits a
side (i.e. when one of the coordinates becomes zero), the Brownian motion will
become 1-dimensional on that side until it terminates at a vertex. Let PX be the
event that the motion terminates at the vertex X having barycentric coordinates
(1; 0; 0); PY and PZ are similarly dened.
Neither i nor j knows the initial point (x; y; z). However, they each learn the
identity of a nearby point{points (xi; yi; zi) and (xj; yj; zj) respectively{chosen
from independent bivariate normal distributions having mean at the point with
barycentric coordinates (x; y; z) and common, extremely small known variance.
Assuming the agents to be rational, their resulting credences in (PX ; PY ; PZ) will
be (x0i; y
0
i; z
0
i)  (xi; yi; zi) and (x
0
j; y
0
j; z
0
j)  (xj; yj; zj). Upon sharing these cre-
dences, they will each come to have posterior credence (x0; y0; z0)  1
2
((x0i; y
0
i; z
0
i)+
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(x0j; y
0
j; z
0
j)) in (PX ; PY ; PZ). The error in these approximations will be small com-
pared to the distance between (x0i; y
0
i; z
0
i) and (x
0
j; y
0
j; z
0
j) with very high probability.
In particular, the error will always be small in those (extremely) rare cases where
the points (x0i; y
0
i; z
0
i) and (x
0
j; y
0
j; z
0
j) are far from each other (and not too close
to the edges). For example, when (x0i; y
0
i; z
0
i) = (:02; :2; :78) and (x
0
j; y
0
j; z
0
j) =
(:8; :08; :12), peer update will result in a credence  (:41; :14; :45). If one then
conditions on :PZ one will obtain posterior  (
41
55
; 14
55
; 0). On the other hand
if i and j rst condition on :PZ they will come to have credences (
1
11
; 10
11
; 0)
and (10
11
; 1
11
; 0), respectively. If now they perform a peer update, preservation of
zero considerations and symmetry imply a posterior of (1
2
; 1
2
; 0) 6 (41
55
; 14
55
; 0). So
commutativity of conditionalization and peer update simply doesn't follow from
naive Bayesian (i.e. coherence) considerations alone.
Fitelson and Jehle did go on to say (as a hedge, perhaps): \But even if we don't
think of EWV-rules as equivalent to some conditionalization, we think [commu-
tativity with conditionalization] should remain a desideratum for EWV-updates.
We don't have the space to defend this claim here." It's of course a pity that they
do not defend the claim, as it certainly requires defense.
Any such defense would have to begin, we believe, with an attempt to explain
away examples such as the foregoing one in which something near to dierence
splitting is rationally mandated. Note that the example favors dierence splitting
because the Euclidean midpoint of the segment connecting the ordered pairs whose
barycentric coordinates correspond to the agents' priors minimizes the sum of the
absolute deviations of the approximating bivariate normals (and so is near to the
expectation of their mean). One would have to say, then, why the Euclidean
metric is the wrong one to be working with in the generic situation in which two
agents have identical evidence but dierent priors.
On the other hand, perhaps one would not have to say much here, for there is
absolutely no reason to think that the Euclidean metric would be an appropriate
metric in this context. When measuring the distance from a probability measure
x = (x1; : : : ; xn) to another probability measure y = (y1; : : : ; yn), the information
distance{so called Kullback-Leibler divergence KL(x; y) =
Pn
i=1 xi log
xi
yi
, is a far
more likely default candidate. And, as we shall see below, when i and j's common
posterior is chosen so as to minimize the sum of these distances to their respective
priors, the resulting update scheme does commute with conditionalization.
Alternatively, one can argue that commutativity is appropriate in cases where
one doesn't have any reason to suspect it would fail. First one would argue
that, in a case where i knows j's prior credence function and knows that :C
(say) is the case, knowledge of her own current credence function \screens o"
the signicance of her prior credence in C. The example involving barycentric
coordinates shows why one cannot make this assumption on the basis of coherence
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considerations alone...the joint distribution of the two priors and the partition
in question (fA;B;Cg, say) may be such that i's prior credence in C yields
information about the relative likelihoods of A and B beyond that provided by
j's prior credence function and her own current credence function alone. That
example relies heavily on the two agents' dierent evidence, however. One might
argue that the same-evidence situation is dierent.
As an example, consider again the scenario in which i's original prior on (A;B;C)
is (1
4
; 1
4
; 1
2
) and j's is (1
4
; 1
2
; 1
4
). Suppose that if the agents rst perform a peer
update, their common posterior will be (x; y; z). (In this case y = z follows from
some seemingly innocuous permutation considerations, but we don't require this
here.) If they next condition on :C, their common posterior will be ( x
x+y
; y
x+y
).
We want to say that if the agents instead: (1) condition on :C; then (2) perform
a peer update, they will arrive at the same common posterior ( x
x+y
; y
x+y
). It's
clear that their credences after (1) will be (1
2
; 1
2
; 0) and (1
3
; 2
3
; 0) respectively.
Consider an alternate scenario in which the agents instead; (0) share their prior
credences in C; then (1) condition on :C; and nally (2) perform a peer update.
Here the agents will denitely land at common posterior ( x
x+y
; y
x+y
) after step (2),
for in this case they would have acquired exactly the same information as in the
original case where they rst performed a peer update, then conditioned on :C.
It is arguable, moreover, that j's evidence in step (0), namely i's prior credence
in C, should in the absence of any reason for thinking the contrary be treated
as neutral with respect to the relative likelihoods of A and B. Indeed, expert
testimony as to probability of C (say) is considered a or the paradigm case in
which so-called Jerey conditionalization (adopt the expert's credence in C as
your own, preserve ratios of other partition cells; Jerey 1965) is appropriate. At
the beginning of step (1) in the alternate scenario, learning your peer's credence in
C is arguably no more nor less informative than learning your own credence in C
at the conclusion of step (1), and so formally equivalent to taking expert (i.e. that
of your future self) testimony as to the likelihood of C. If that's right, however,
then the agents' credences after performing step (0) will have form (a; a; k) and
(b; 2b; l) respectively, so that after step (1) they will have credences (1
2
; 1
2
; 0) and
(1
3
; 2
3
; 0) respectively, exactly as in the actual scenario of the previous paragraph.
Since the nal posteriors in the alternate scenario are ( x
x+y
; y
x+y
), then, the nal
posteriors in the scenario from the previous paragraph will be ( x
x+y
; y
x+y
) as well.
That is, peer update commutes with conditionalization.
These considerations convince us that Fitelson and Jehle's desideratum is viable.
Accordingly, we accept it; in the absence of known protocols to the contrary
(in the same evidence case, in particular), peer update should commute with
conditionalization.
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4. Peer update and relative entropy minimization
In this section we present an update scheme that we believe should in some sense
be considered \standard".6 The rule isn't new. It is, for example, one member
of a family of update rules considered in Easwaran et. al. (2016).7 On the other
hand, we will argue its virtues in a couple of new ways. Among these virtues,
one nds that it commutes with conditionalization, preserves independences and
minimizes the sum of the Kullback-Leibler divergences from the priors to the
common posterior. (We establish these properties in an appendix.)
According to this rule, if A and B are two cells of the partition under consideration
and ri =
Pi(A)
Pi(B)
, rj =
Pj(A)
Pj(B)
are ratios assigned by i and j to these cells' respective
probabilities, then the corresponding ratio arising from the common posterior
ought to be the geometric mean of r1 and r2. In the two-cell case fA;:Ag,
therefore, one updates to (u; 1  u) given priors (x; 1  x) and (y; 1  y), where
u
1  u
=
 x
(1  x)
y
(1  y)
1=2
: (1)
As motivation for (1) we'll provide two arguments (one heuristic) in the case where
i's prior is (1=5; 4=5) and j's is (1=2; 1=2). That is, we'll give plausible reasons
why, in this case, the common posterior should be (1=3; 2=3).
The rst argument is simply the relative entropy one. The Kullback-Leibler di-
vergence from (u; 1   u) to (1=5; 4=5) is given by u log u
1=5
+ (1   u) log 1 u
4=5
; the
Kullback-Leibler divergence from (u; 1   u) to (1=2; 1=2) is given by u log u
1=2
+
(1  u) log 1 u
1=2
. The sum of these quantities is
H(u) = 2u log u+ 2(1  u) log(1  u)  u log 1=5  (1  u) log 4=5  log 1=2:
The minimum of H occurs where
H 0(u) = 2 log
u
1  u
+ log 4 = 0:
A quick calculation gives (u; 1  u) = (1
3
; 2
3
), in agreement with (1).
6We don't claim that it would be immune from (coherence-based, even) objections. In par-
ticular, it would likely be subject to the usual array of criticisms that have plagued entropy
maximization solutions in other contexts (see, e.g., Seidenfeld 1986 or Friedman and Shimony
1971). On the other hand, such solutions arguably do have formal merit as approximations to
ideal behavior in extreme or limiting cases (we urge caution here, but see Vasudevan 2018).
At any rate it isn't possible to criticize a method that one doesn't know about; this scheme,
whatever its faults, marks a clear advance on dierence splitting, and should be disseminated.
7These authors, curiously, do not favor the member of the family we are interested in. This
is because they advocate for synergy in updating; we took issue with this in footnote 4.
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For the second argument, imagine that a fair coin will be tossed if and only if :A
obtains. If i and j expand the algebra to accomodate the toss then of course their
expanded priors will be (1=5; 2=5; 2=5) and (1=2; 1=4; 1=4). Suppose now they were
to condition on the disjunction of the rst two cells (the event A_ (:A^ heads),
say) and then perform a peer update. Their credences after conditioning will be
(1=3; 2=3; 0) and (2=3; 1=3; 0). Symmetry and preservation of zero considerations
now indicate that their credences will be (1=2; 1=2; 0) after the peer update.
We next assume that i and j's peer updating commutes with conditionalization.
(As we stated at the end of Section 3, we accept Fitelson and Jehle's proposed
desideratum.) Thus they will also come to have credence function (1=2; 1=2; 0)
should they peer update then condition. After the initial peer update they will
have credences of the form (x; x; y). On the other hand, permutation consider-
ations point to x = y. That implies that i's posterior credence in A, when she
considers the coin toss, is 1=3. The nal step is then that peer update should
commute with marginalization onto the original sub-algebra.
Beware: i mustn't subscribe to the commutativity of peer updating and marginal-
ization in general. What justies it in this case (the proponent will say) is that the
ratio of the sizes of the to-be-amalgamated subcells is uncontroversial. Indeed,
in the case where i and j rst marginalize, then update, i's credences rst evolve
from (1=5; 2=5; 2=5) to (1=5; 4=5), whereupon she learns j's post-marginalization
credence function, namely (1
2
; 1
2
). Since the coin is uncontroversially fair, howev-
er, this gives her knowledge of j's pre-marginalization credence function as well,
namely (1
2
; 1=4; 1=4). So she acquires the same information she would acquire if
the agents were to perform a peer update rst, then marginalize. Accordingly,
the update and the marginalization ought to commute, in this special case.8
Unlike split-the-dierence, the proposed scheme can be coherently implemented
with a peer. For imagine a proposition-valued random variable P . Denote i's
initial credence in P by x and j's initial credence in P by y. Suppose that i
regards j as a peer and updates in agreement with (1). We assume, for simplicity,
that i's joint distribution for (x; y) is distributed on eight pairs, with weights as
indicated in Table 1.
It is now easy to see that i is Reection-obeying. For example, if P0 is such that
x = 1=5 then, upon learning that P = P0, i's posterior distribution for u will be
(2=5; 3=5) on (0; 1=3). In particular, E(ujP = P0) = 1=5. The remaining cases
are similar, so i's behavior under this model exhibits diachronic coherence.
8One may make a fruitful comparison to the \Infomin" solution to the Judy Benjamin prob-
lem (van Fraassen 1981) here. When Judy receives a message yielding information about the
relative sizes she ought to assign the Red regions, this may (says Infomin) inuence her credence
in Blue{but not in a case where the message fails to alter Judy's relative credences in the Red
regions (a fortiori, in a case where Judy knows this in advance).
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Table 1
x y u Prob
0 1=5 0 1=10
1=5 0 0 1=10
1=5 1/2 1=3 3=20
1=2 1=5 1=3 3=20
1=2 4=5 2=3 3=20
4=5 1=2 2=3 3=20
4=5 1 1 1=10
1 4=5 1 1=10
The model moreover represents a plausible implementation of the Equal Weight
View. (Apart from employing the EWV-friendly (1), i's joint distribution for
(x; y) and update function u(x; y) are symmetric in the variables x and y, im-
plying that, from i's perspective, her own credences and those of j are treated
interchangeably.) Since, then, it is not the case that x = y almost surely, we may
conclude that Theorem 1 doesn't overgeneralize in the manner of Theorem 2.
5. Appendix
Theorem 1. Let fA1; A2; : : : ; Ang be a measurable partition. Suppose that i
and j have priors
i = (a1; a2; : : : ; an) and j = (b1; b2; : : : ; bn)
over (A1; A2; : : : ; An). Let H() = KL(; i) + KL(; j) take on its mini-
mum value (as  ranges over probability measures on (A1; A2; : : : ; An)) at 0 =
(c1; c2; : : : ; cn). Then for any xed indices l;m, 1  l 6= m  n,
c2l ambm = c
2
malbl: (1)
In particular, if ambm 6= 0 then
cl
cm
is the geometric mean of al
am
and bl
bm
.
Proof. Permuting indices if necessary, we may assume that l = 1 and m = n.
Writing 0  log 0 = 0, H() is continuous on a compact domain and so attains
its minimum value at some 0 = (c1; c2; : : : ; cn). Plainly c1 = 0 if a1b1 = 0 and
cn = 0 if anbn = 0; in either case, (1) follows.
We may therefore assume that a1b1anbn > 0. Writing  = (x1; x2; : : : ; xn),
H() = H(x1; : : : ; xn 1) =
nX
t=1
(2xt log xt   xt log atbt):
Since xn = 1  x1   x2        xn 1, the rst partial derivative of H is
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Hx1(x1; : : : ; xn 1) = 2 log
x1
xn
+ log
anbn
a1b1
:
Since H takes on its minimum value at one must have Hx1(0) = 0. Therefore,
log( c1
cn
)2 = log anbn
a1b1
. Clearing logarithms, we obtain (1). qed
Theorem 2. Let fA1; A2; : : : ; Ang be a measurable partition. Let u be the
update function having the property that
u((a1; a2; : : : ; an); (b1; b2; : : : ; bn)) = (c1; c2; : : : ; cn);
where c2l ambm = c
2
malbl, 1  l 6= m  n: Then u commutes with conditionalization
on events in the algebra generated by A1; A2; : : : ; An.
Proof. Let E be a union of partition cells. By rearranging indices if necessary we
may assume that E = A1 [ A2 [    [ Ak for some k. Suppose we rst condition
on E, then update. After conditioning on E, we get
0i = (
a1
a1 + a2 +   + ak
;
a2
a1 + a2 +   + ak
; : : : ;
ak
a1 + a2 +   + ak
; 0; : : : ; 0)
and
0j = (
b1
b1 + b2 +   + bk
;
b2
b1 + b2 +   + bk
; : : : ;
bk
b1 + b2 +   + bk
; 0; : : : ; 0):
Now u(0i; 
0
j) = (d1; d2; : : : ; dk; 0; : : : ; 0), where
d2l
ambm
(a1 + a2 +   + ak)(b1 + b2 +   + bk)
=d2m
albl
(a1 + a2 +   + ak)(b1 + b2 +   + bk)
;
which implies that d2l ambm = d
2
malbl, 1  l 6= m  k:
Next we rst update, then condition on E. We have u(i; j) = (c1; c2; : : : ; cn),
where c2l ambm = c
2
malbl, 1  l 6= m  n: Conditioning next on E, we get to
(d1; d2; : : : ; dk; 0; : : : ; 0), where (c1 + c2 +   + ck)dm = cm, 1  m  k. Therefore
d2l (c1 + c2 +   + ck)
2ambm = d
2
m(c1 + c2 +   + ck)
2albl;
so that d2l ambm = d
2
malbl; 1  l 6= m  k: Since these equations clearly determine
d1; d2; : : : ; dk subject to the constraint d1 + d2 +   + dk = 1, we are done. qed
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